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SOUTHERN Cert to CA 8 
(Gibson, Van Oosterhout & Matthes) 
v. 




SEABOARD ALLIED Federal/Civil Timely by extn 
No. 78-604 
SEABOARD COAST LINE CO., ET AL. Same 
v. 
SEABOARD ALLIED MILLIN CO., ET AL. Federal/Civil Timely by extn 
( 
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SUMMARY: Petitioners in these curve-lined cases challenge 
the CA's holding that it had jurisdiction to review the ICC's 
refusal to investigate the lawfulness of a proposed tariff that 
respondent claimed was patently violative of several sections 
of the Interstate Co~merce Act. 
FACTS: Other than the ICC, the petitioners in these 
curve-lined cases are railroads who filed proposed rate 
increases with the ICC. Respondents are shippers, private 
associations and governmental agencies, including the United 
States Department of Agriculture, which protested the proposed 
increases to the ICC. 
The tariffs filed by petitioners proposed a 
limited-duration, 20% seasonal surcharge on the shipment of 
specified grains in several midwestern and southeastern 
States. The rate increases were to apply only between 
September 15 and December 15, 1977. Such seasonal surcharges 
were authorized by Section 202(d) of the Railroad 
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 [the 4-R Act], 
49 U.S.C. § 15(17), and regulations promulgated by the ICC 
thereunder, 49 C.F.R. § 1109.10. 
Respondents alleged . the proposed tariffs were unreasonable, 
discriminatory and patently violative of Sections 1(5), 2, 
3(1), 4(1) and 15(17) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 u.s.c. 
§§ 1(5), 2, 3(1), 4(1) and 15(17). They asked the ICC either 
to reject the tariffs as patently unlawful or to suspend them 
until an investigation was made into their lawfulness under 
Section 15 (8) (a) of the Act. 
c 
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By order issued September 14, 1977, Division II denied the 
respondents' petition to reject the proposed tariffs. In a 
separate order issued the same day, the full Commission 
declined to suspend the tariffs or to open an investigation 
under Section 15(8) (a). It found the respondents' evidence 
offered in support of alleged violations of the Act 
insufficient to warrant such action, noted that Congress 
intended to authorize experimentation with seasonal rate-making 
in passing Section 202(d) of the 4-R Act, and observed that the 
complaint sections of the Act protect the interests of any 
party adversely affected by the rates. The Commission 
therefore determined to "permit this temporary adjustment to 
become effective." 
Respondent Seaboard Allied Milling then obtained from the 
CA a temporary judicial stay of the ICC's orders refusing to 
reject or suspend the tariffs. TheCA, however, vacated its 
stay order after a hearing, but directed the railroads to 
maintain sufficient records to permit determination of 
overcharges in the event that the complainants prevailed on 
review. The ICC then issued an order permitting the railroads 
to implement the tariff on one day's notice with provision made 
for the recordkeeping directed by the CA. The tariffs then 
went into effect. 
On appeal, the principal issue presented was whether the CA 
had jurisdiction to entertain a petition for review of the ICC 
orders refusing to reject or suspend the proposed tariffs and 




HOLDING BELOW: Observing that there was respectful 
authority that it had no jurisdiction to review the ICC's 
refusal to suspend the proposed tariffs, and that the period 
covered by the tariffs had long since expired anyway, the CA 
found it unnecessary to decide whether it had any jurisdiction 
to review the no-suspension order. The protective orders 
issued by the ICC and the court had mooted the practical import 
of that issue in any event. 
The CA then framed the question presented on whether it had 
jurisdiction to review the propriety of ICC's termination of 
its investigation into the lawfulness of the proposed tariffs. 
The court held that such jurisdiction existed in the "peculiar 
circumstances of this case" where a substantial question of the 
tariffs' patent illegality had been presented and those charges 
had not been adequately investigated by the ICC. 
In so holding, the CA principally relied on City of Chicago 
v. United States, 396 U.S. 162 (1969), which holds that an ICC 
decision to terminate a Section 13a(l) investigation is a final 
order subject to judicial review. Jurisdiction to review an 
ICC decision not to pursue an investigation was also supported 
by Alton Railroad Co. v. United States, 287 u.s. 229, 236-37 
(1932) • The Court acknowledged that Arrow Transportation Co. 
v. Southern Railway Co., 372 U.S. 658, 667-68 (1963), supported 
the view that the Court had no power to review the Commission's 
refusal to suspend the proposed tariffs. However, theCA 
believed that the ICC's suspension and investigation powers 
were separate and distinct. And, the factors prompting 
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( Arrow's holding that suspension orders were not reviewable did 
not apply to ICC orders refusing to make, or terminating, an 
investigation of the lawfulness of a proposed tariff. 
Here, the shippers had made substantial charges that the 
tariffs proposed were patently violative of the long-haul, 
short-haul clause of section 4(1) of the Act, as well as other 
provisions of the statute. The ICC had a duty not to permit 
unlawful tariffs to go into effect and had failed to make an 
adequate investigation of the section 4(1) and other violations 
alleged. Disagreeing with the CA DC's conclusion in Asphalt 
Roofing Mfr.'s Ass'n v. ICC, 567 F.2d 994 (1977), that ICC 
decisions not to pursue an investigation are under all 
circumstances not final decisions subject to judicial review, 
the CA 8 reasoned that the ICC's failure to investigate the 
charges of patent illegality allowed the tariffs to go into 
effect and was the equivalent of a finding that the tariffs 
were lawful. There was, thus, as much justification for 
treating the ICC's termination of its investigation into the 
shippers' claims of patent illegality as a final order subject 
to review, as there was for this Court's holding in Aberdeen & 
Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 318-19 (1975)1 that a 
Commission decision to give no further consideration to 
environmental factors in a general revenue proceeding was a 
final order subject to review. 
Moreover, significant policy reasons supported the court's 
holding. For, if the ICC's refusal to pursue an investigation 
of the shippers' claims was unreviewable, their only recourse 
( 
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wouJ.d be to file complaints under section 13(1) after the rates 
became effective. And, in a section 13(1) proceeding, the 
burden would be on the complainants to show the unlawfulness of 
the rates; whereas, in a section 15(8) (a) proceeding initiated 
by the Commission, the burden would be on the carriers to 
establish the lawfulness and reasonableness of the proposed 
tariffs. Also, by permitting review of the Commission's 
termination of its investigation, the need for ICC and judicial 
consideration of numerous section 13(1) complaints initiated by 
individual parties would be obviated. 
CONTENTIONS: Petitioners contend that the Court erred by 
misconstruing the ICC's decision as an order terminating an 
investigation, when in fact all the agency did was refuse to 
( '-../ initiate an investigation under section 15 (8) (a). The City of 
Chicago case is, thus, directly on point. For, although 
holding that a decision to terminate a previously opened 
investigation was reviewable, it also held that a decision not 
to open an investigation was unreviewable. 396 U.S. at 
165-66; accord, New Jersey v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 324, 
329 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd, 359 u.s. 27 (1959) (refusal to open a 
section 13a(l) investigation unreviewable). 
This conclusion is also supported by Arrow and United 
States v. SCRAP, 412 u.s. 669 (1973), which make clear that a 
decision not to susperid a proposed tariff is unreviewable. As 
the DC Circuit reasoned in Asphalt Roofing, . because the 
decision not to suspend a proposed tariff and the decision not 
to open an investigation are two sides of the same coin, 
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( no-investigation orders are no more reviewable than 
no-suspension orders. Like the decision as to whether to 
\-~-... 
suspend a proposed tariff, the decision whether to investigate 
its lawfulness is committed to the agency's unreviewable 
discretion by section 15 {8) {a). 
Petitioners further observe that the CA e ~ red in asserting 
that an ICC decision not to investigate a proposed tariff 
places the tariff in effect and is the equivalent of a finding 
of lawfulness. Not so. It is the decision not to suspend the 
tariff that permits it to go into effect~ and, the decision not 
to investigate is not a final determination that the particular 
rates are just, reasonable or lawful. Cf. SCRAP, 412 u.s. at 
692 n.l6. The merits of respondents' charges of illegality and 
unreasonableness, claim petitioners, can be finally determined 
in a section 13{1) proceeding. Under that section the ICC is 
under a duty to investigate upon complaint of any aggrieved 
party if any reasonable grounds are presented for an 
investigation. 
By permitting judicial review of the agency's refusal to 
open a section 15(8) (a) investigation, theCA has seriously 
disrupted the Commission's rate review process and violated all 
of the principles underlying the doctrines of primary 
jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
Respondents answer that the CA's decision was correct and 
consistent with longstanding case law. They stress that this 
is an unusual case because it involved petitions to reject and 




patently violative of the long-haul, short-haul provisions of 
section 4(1) and of other sections of the Act as well. The 
case was not processed as a routine suspension case wherein the 
ICC allows a proposed tariff to take effect over protest 
without issuing any order expressly authorizing the rates to 
take effect. Rather, the case was assigned to a formal docket 
and transferred directly to the full Commission, which issued a 
formal order allowing the rates to take effect. For purposes 
of this proceeding, the Commission's termination of its 
investigation of alleged section 4(1) and other violations 
finally disposed of the issues of patent illegality raised by 
the petitions to reject and suspend. The ICC was under an 
affirmative duty not to permit tariffs containing fourth 
C: section violations to become effective, and the Commission 
violated that duty by allowing the tariffs to take effect 
without resolving the serious claims of patent illegality under 
section 4(1) that had been raised. Judicial review, thus, was 
warranted under the rationale of the Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate 
Cases, 98 S. Ct. 2053, 2058-59 n. 17 (1978), to ensure that the 
Commission would not overstep the bounds of its statutory 
authority. 
Neither Arrow nor the DC Circuit's decision in Asphalt 
Roofing are inconsistent with theCA 8's decision. Those cases 
hold only that refusals to suspend or to investigate the 
reasonableness of rate increases are unreviewable. They do not 
insulate from review here the Commission's refusal to comply 




containing unreviewed fourth section departures to take 
effect. Neither case dealt ~ith the issues of patent 
illegality raised herein, and the DC Circuit has recently cited 
with approval the CA's decision at bar for the proposition that 
a "Commission decision not to investigate a proposed tariff is 
reviewable where a substantial issue of patent illegality has 
been presented." National Small Shipment Traffic Conference, 
Inc. v. ICC, No. 78-1099, slip op. at 9 n.34 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 
26, 1978). 
& n.3.] 
[But see Reply of Southern R. Co., No. 78-575, at 3 
The Solicitor General has filed a memorandum with the Court 
urging that cert be granted. Although conceding that Asphalt 
Roofing is technically distinguishable in that it involved a 
( -' general rate increase protested on grounds of unreasonableness 
'-
and no claims of patent illegality involving alleged fourth 
section departures, the SG believes that Asphalt's reasoning 
that the Commission's suspension and investigation powers are 
inseparable is fundamentally inconsistent with the contrary 
views expressed by the CA 8 here. In view of the conflict and 
the critical importance of questions bearing on the 
reviewability of the ICC no-investigation orders, the SG urges 
plenary review • 
. The SG, however, disagrees with both the petitioners and 
the respondents on the merits. His position is that a 
Commission decision not to open a section 15(8) investigation 
is ultimately subject to judicial review but is not immediately 
ripe for review. The SG reasons that the decision not to open 
a section 15(8) investigation does no more than determine who 
shall bear the burden of persuasion, for the protestants can 
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immediately file a section 13(1) complaint that the Commission 
is under a duty to investigate. At the close of the section 
13(1) proceeding, the Commission's decision not to open a 
section 15(8) investigation would be reviewable if the 
allocation of the burden of persuasion were critical to the 
outcome. 
ANALYSIS: Because this case involves what the CA 
characterized as "substantial claims of patent illegality," its 
decision may not be squarely in conflict with the DC Circuit's 
decision in Asphalt Roofing or with any holding of this Court. 
Nevertheless, the reasoning of such cases as Arrow, City of 
Chicago, and Asphalt Roofing does support the petitioners' 
contention that the courts of appeals have no jurisdiction to 
review an ICC decision not to open a section 15(8) (a) 
investigation into the lawfulness of a proposed tariff. And, 
the CA's characterization of the ICC's orders denying the 
petitions to reject or suspend the tariffs as orders 
terminating an investigation into the lawfulness of the 
proposed tariffs seems questionable. 
But, whatever one's view of the merits, this case presents 
a question of first impression that may . well be of sufficient 
import as to merit plenary review regardless of the existence 
or non-existence of the conflicts alleged here. 
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ABSENT NOT VOTING 
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> 
May 28, 1979 
78-575 Southern Railway v. Seaboard 
Dear John: 
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that 
I took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Since r e lv, 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.§n~ ~tnttt uf tqt )lnittb ~tatts' 
~rut~~. <!J. 21lblJ1~ 
May 29, 1979 
Re: Nos. 78-575, 78-597 & 78-604 -
Southern Railway Co. v. Seaboard 
Allied Milling Corp, etc. 
Dear John, 
With thanks, I join. 
Sincerely yours, 
lr~ 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
erne _ 
/ 
-
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